

An Exploration of the Drivers of Private Tutoring in Egypt

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The rise of private tutoring globally has raised concerns over the hidden costs of “free” education systems and how these costs contribute to the persistence of inequality. We examine the drivers of tutoring at different levels of education in Egypt in an effort to understand why private tutoring has expanded despite policy efforts to prevent its spread. We use nationally representative survey data and qualitative data on youth experiences in public, private, and religious schools. Our findings indicate that the drivers of tutoring are multiple and vary by schooling level. Structured around high-stakes exams, the Egyptian education system has fostered the growth of a diverse tutoring market. In general secondary school, tutoring has become so widespread that teachers and students shirk in school to devote more attention to tutoring. Structural factors and the expectation that students will engage in tutoring have thus become self-reinforcing. In basic education, teacher pressure is a major motivation for public school students to take tutoring. Given the failure of Egypt’s efforts to ban and create alternatives to tutoring, there is an urgent need to test mechanisms for ensuring accountability in schools.

Introduction

Private tutoring constitutes a “shadow education system” in countries where the widespread existence of paid academic supplementation parallels public education systems that are ostensibly free (Bray 2006; Bray and Kwo 2013). When tutoring becomes so widespread that paying for private lessons is essential to school success, it becomes an effective form of privatization that undermines the recognized global principle of free basic education (Bray and Kwo 2013). Egypt is one country where, while public education is technically free, private tutoring has become an undeniable fact of life for students, despite policy efforts to control the practice (Assaad and Krafft 2015a). In order to design effective policies to reduce private tutoring and promote equitable access to quality public education, it is critical to understand the reasons why Egyptian households invest so heavily in this form of shadow education.

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In this article, we investigate the drivers of private tutoring in Egypt across different education levels. We begin by developing a framework of the main drivers of tutoring from the international literature: (1) the desire to gain a competitive advantage in the school system, (2) school quality, and (3) teacher incentives. We then assess evidence for each of these drivers in the Egyptian context, employing a combination of quantitative data from the nationally representative Survey of Young People in Egypt 2009/2014 panel and qualitative data from in-depth interviews with young people in the Greater Cairo Metropolitan Area. In our conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings for policies that aim to reduce the prevalence of tutoring and promote equality in the education system.

Background

Drivers of Private Tutoring in Egypt and Beyond

A number of factors have been linked to the growth of private tutoring across low- and middle-income countries (Tansel and Bircan 2006; Kim and Lee 2010; Silova 2010; Lee and Shouse 2011; Kwo and Bray 2014; Zhang 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a; Ille 2015). Although reasons for the growth in private tutoring vary across contexts, the underlying factors that drive demand for tutoring can be grouped into three interrelated categories: (1) the desire among families to give their children a competitive advantage in the education system, (2) poor school quality, and (3) teacher incentives. As shown in figure 1, these broad drivers encompass several specific, sometimes overlapping, direct motivations for using tutoring. For example, the desire to gain a competitive advantage may be due to the exam orientation of the education system or the inadequacy of the mainstream schooling system. The latter factor, along with teacher shirking, also links to school quality as a driver of private tutoring.

Although the traditional assumption is that tutoring is primarily used by students who need extra support, this is often not the case in contexts where private tutoring has been expanding rapidly (Bray and Kwo 2013). Tutoring may also be used by already advantaged families to give their children a competitive edge within mass public education systems (Kim and Lee 2010; Bray and Kwo 2013; Hartmann 2013; Huang 2013). In many countries, students from wealthier or more educated families (Tansel and Bircan 2006; Kim and Lee 2010; Jayachandran 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a), higher-performing students (Kim and Lee 2010), and students in elite schools (Lee and Shouse 2011; Zhang 2014) invest more in private tutoring.

One motivation for investing in tutoring may be the exam-driven nature of school progression in some education systems (Tansel and Bircan 2006; Silova 2010; Zhang 2014). In countries where demand for education has increased dramatically, competition for limited seats that are allocated through exams can drive demand for tutoring (Kim and Lee 2010). The Egyptian

| Driver | | Direct motivation | Indicators |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Competitive advantage | School quality | Exam orientation | Increasing prevalence through progressive levels of schooling Peaks in prevalence during exam years Drop-off in prevalence in terminal schooling stages |
| | | Symbolic function | Expectation of tutoring in certain levels View of tutoring as an investment in children Higher prevalence among better performing students |
| | | Inadequacy of mainstream schooling | Association between school quality (e.g. class size) and prevalence of tutoring Absenteeism to attend tutoring |
| | Teacher incentives | Teacher shirking | Differences in quality of instruction in-class and in tutoring Association between indicators of instructional quality and prevalence of tutoring |
| | | Direct teacher pressure | Percentage of students taking tutoring with their own teacher Direct reports of teacher pressure or coercion |

FIG. 1.—Potential drivers of private tutoring and examples of empirical indicators that provide evidence for these drivers. SOURCE.—Authors' creation.

education system is driven by high-stakes exams, particularly at the transitions between schooling levels. Together with an extensive curriculum and an emphasis on rote learning, the importance of exams has been cited in previous literature as one of the primary drivers of tutoring (World Bank 2007, 2008; Assaad and Krafft 2015a).

A number of characteristics of tutoring markets also provide evidence that exams drive tutoring demand, including increasing prevalence of tutoring during exam or transition years (Dang 2007; Zhan et al. 2013), higher demand for tutoring in examination as opposed to nonexamination subjects (Sobhy 2012; Zhan et al. 2013), and the fact that tutoring curricula in some contexts, including Egypt, often follow official syllabi (Hartmann 2008, 2013). Tutoring may also be perceived to be more directly related to exam preparation than regular classroom activities, for example, because tutors focus more directly on exams than in-school teachers (Kwo and Bray 2014), a contributing factor in Egypt as well (Hartmann 2008, 2013). Both the prevalence (Assaad and Krafft 2015a) and the cost of tutoring peak close to examination time in Egypt (Rizk and Abou-Ali 2016). The relative value of tutoring for exam preparation is also suggested by the fact that students in Egypt and elsewhere skip school in order to take private lessons (Tansel and Bircan 2006; Silova 2010; Hartmann 2013).

The association between tutoring and competitive school environments may be so strong in some contexts that tutoring takes on a symbolic as well as

functional purpose in families' efforts to advantage their children (Lee and Shouse 2011). In several East Asian countries, families resort to tutoring in order to ease anxieties about outcomes in a competitive schooling environment (Zhan et al. 2013; Kwo and Bray 2014; Zhang 2014). Research from Egypt also suggests that, at least among students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, participation in tutoring has become a social expectation (Hartmann 2008, 2013).

Gaining a competitive advantage in the school system through tutoring may also be a response to poor quality of education, particularly in countries that have expanded access to education rapidly (Bray and Kwo 2013). Egypt is one example of a school system that expanded dramatically with free public education (World Bank 2007). In combination with enrollment pressure, budget constraints led to increasing class sizes and deteriorating public school quality over time, making teaching at school insufficient for exam preparation or future employability (World Bank 2008; Elbadawy 2015).

In addition to such systemwide structural factors, poor school quality as a driver of tutoring may be related to teachers' (dis)incentives to provide quality instruction in class. Private tutoring can be a mechanism for poorly paid public school teachers to supplement their incomes (Silova 2010; Sobhy 2012; Zhang 2014; Ille 2015). The income provided by private tutoring may be such a strong motivation that in contexts where public school teachers give private lessons to their own students, they have an incentive to underperform in the classroom in order to increase students' demand for paid lessons (Jayachandran 2014). Thus, poor quality of instruction in schools may be—at least in part—a consequence, as well as a cause, of the spread of private tutoring.

The incentive for teachers to encourage private lessons may be so pronounced that they directly pressure their students into taking private tutoring (Silova 2010) or give preferential treatment in class to students already taking tutoring (Zhang 2014). In Egypt, half of students' tutors are classroom teachers (Ille 2015), and teachers use both direct and indirect forms of pressure, ranging from withholding curriculum content in school to threats of expulsion, to encourage students to take tutoring (Sobhy 2012; Hartmann 2013; Ille 2015). Based on his seminal work in the field, Bray (2017) also argues that, as private tutoring reaches scale, the drivers of tutoring may become self-reinforcing and tutoring becomes a *de facto* requirement of the education system.

Much of the existing literature on tutoring in Egypt focuses on the quantities and determinants of tutoring (Elbadawy et al. 2009; Sayed and Langsten 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a; Ille 2015; Rizk and Abou-Ali 2016), with relatively less attention paid to decision making around using tutoring. These quantitative studies show that tutoring is common throughout different levels of the education system (Assaad and Krafft 2015a). Tutoring is

expensive, constituting the single largest category of education expenditures. Average expenditure on tutoring for current students equals 18 percent of average per capita consumption (CAPMAS 2016). Tutoring is linked to socio-economic status, as tutoring prevalence and expenditure increase with wealth and parents' education, but there are not gender differences in tutoring investments (Elbadawy et al. 2009; Sayed and Langsten 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a).

The few qualitative studies on tutoring in Egypt indicate that a variety of factors drive tutoring. Sobhy (2012), on the basis of a comparative ethnographic account of two secondary schools for boys in Greater Cairo, argues that coercive tactics by teachers were a main driver of tutoring in the vocational school, whereas the role of exams was relatively more important in general secondary school. In both cases, the overall poor quality of the education system and lack of school accountability were key facilitators of the tutoring market. Hartmann (2008, 2013), based on an ethnographic study of tutoring among both middle- and lower-class students, attributes the prevalence of tutoring to a mix of poor school quality, exam orientation, symbolic value, and teacher pressure, with lower-class students more subject to the latter.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ a mix of quantitative and qualitative data to assess the drivers of private tutoring in Egypt. In doing so, we pay particular attention to potential differences in students' reasons for enrolling in tutoring across different school levels and school types (public, private, religious), as well as different forms of tutoring.

The School System in Egypt and Forms of Private Tutoring

In Egypt, children typically enter school at age 6 and spend grades 1–6 in primary school and grades 7–9 in preparatory (lower secondary) school (see fig. 2). If students continue to upper secondary, they are tracked into either vocational (technical) secondary or general (academic) secondary (grades 10–12¹). Exams at the end of preparatory determine whether young people are tracked into vocational or general secondary. Throughout the school system, exams also play an important role in passing each individual year of schooling. General secondary requires higher scores and is essentially a guarantee of access to higher education; 94 percent of those who attend general secondary go on to higher education, although not necessarily at their preferred institution or in their preferred specialization, while only 9 percent of those from vocational secondary go on to higher education (Assaad 2010).

The type of higher education that young people can access and their specializations within higher education are determined by their test scores

¹ A small share of vocational secondary programs are 5 year rather than 3 year.




FIG. 2.—Structure of the Egyptian school system NOTE.—Ages in parentheses are ideal, assuming on-time entry and no repetition. SOURCES.—Authors' creation and UNESCO (2018).

at the end of the general secondary stage, which is known as the *thanawiyyah 'ammah* (Buckner 2013). Higher education includes two-year postsecondary institutes and two types of four-year degrees: higher institutes (less prestigious) and universities (more prestigious; Krafft et al. 2013; Barsoum 2014; Krafft et al. 2019).

Enrollment rates in Egypt are high. The gross enrollment rate for primary as of 2016 was 104 percent, for preparatory 97 percent, for secondary 75 percent, and for tertiary 34 percent (World Bank Databank 2019). The vast majority of students in Egypt attend public schools (90 percent in pre-tertiary levels [Krafft et al. 2019]). The next most common school type is Islamic religious (Azhari) school, attended by approximately 6 percent of students across all levels (Krafft et al. 2019). In primary through secondary, 2–3 percent of students attend private schools. This increases to 13 percent in higher education, when students may choose private education if they do not get into their preferred public institution or specialization (Barsoum 2017; Krafft et al. 2019).

Tutoring in Egypt takes multiple forms. The most common form of tutoring is private lessons (*durus khosouseya*, or *durus* for short), where one student or a small group of students gather for tutoring sessions. Private tutoring centers have attracted increasing attention in Egypt (Hartmann 2013, 2008; Qadr 2018) but as of 2014 were the site of only 8 percent of private

lessons, compared with 64 percent of lessons held in the student's or teacher's home (Ille 2015). Past research with nationally representative data indicates that more than half (53 percent) of primary, preparatory, and general secondary students take private lessons (Assaad and Krafft 2015a). Private lessons are generally perceived to be higher quality and are more expensive than other tutoring types due to customized attention and frequent follow-up by the tutor. The offering of private lessons by public school teachers was officially banned by the Ministry of Education in 1998, but the ban has proven difficult to enforce (Hartmann 2013). In this article, we distinguish between "private tutoring," which consists of one-on-one lessons between the student and a tutor, and "private group tutoring," in which two or more students meet with a tutor outside of school hours and off school grounds.

Another form of tutoring in Egypt is group "fortification" lessons offered on school grounds but after hours, for a fee. In 1986, all schools were mandated to offer voluntary (for students) *magmu'at- al-taqweyya*, which we refer to as "in-school group tutoring," by the Ministry of Education in an effort to counteract the expansion of private lessons (Sobhy 2012).² In a nationally representative survey, approximately 10 percent of students across levels took after-school group tutoring (Assaad and Krafft 2015a). In-school group lessons are usually attended by a larger number of students and are perceived to be an inferior substitute for private lessons (Hartmann 2013). In addition, defeating the rationale for the mandate, in-school tutoring is sometimes imposed on students by teachers and school administrators in order to supplement their income (Sobhy 2012).

Data and Methods

Quantitative Methods

The primary data source for our quantitative analysis is the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) panel. The survey was first fielded in 2009, gathering data from a nationally representative sample of 15,029 youth aged 10–29 (Population Council 2011). A follow-up survey was fielded in 2013/2014, which collected data on 10,916 of these youth (Roushdy and Sieverding 2015). Sample weights were used in the original survey to reflect the sampling strategy and weights were updated in 2013/2014 to account for attrition (Roushdy and Sieverding 2015).

² Official fees for in-school group tutoring are set by the Ministry of Education and vary by region and school level and year. The ministry raised fees in 2016; fees were set higher for urban than for rural areas, and higher also for higher levels of schooling. For example, fees for preparatory-level group lessons in urban areas were raised to 35 Egyptian pounds (just under US\$4 at the time) for the first 2 years of preparatory and to 40 Egyptian pounds for the terminal year. Fees are divided between the teacher (90 percent), the school administration (5 percent), and the teachers union (5 percent). When issuing the fee increase, the ministry confirmed that the *magmu'at- al-taqweyya* are voluntary and not obligatory for students (Yehya 2016).

A detailed education section included questions on school conditions for current students and retrospective information on educational experiences for all youth. Youth were asked about attendance of private tutoring, private group tutoring, and in-school group tutoring at each level of school they had attended. For the current school year, current students were also asked how many subjects they were tutored in, the cost of those lessons, whether the tutor was their regular classroom teacher, and, if so, why they attended lessons with their teacher. We analyze this series of questions on educational supplements using descriptive methods.

In addition to the descriptive methods, to examine the net effects of background characteristics on tutoring attendance, we use multivariate probit models for the probability of taking different education supplements. The different covariates included in our multivariate analysis include those that have previously been linked with education and tutoring in Egypt (Krafft et al. 2013; Assaad and Krafft 2015a; Elbadawy 2015). We also examine differences in outcomes by sex. Place of residence, categorized as urban, informal urban housing (slums), or rural, is examined together with Egypt's main geographic regions. Mother's and father's education are examined categorically, as well as father's work status when the respondent was age 15, as a proxy for family socioeconomic status. We also control for, categorically, cohort of birth (in approximately 5-year increments) to assess trends in tutoring, after accounting for other characteristics.

Qualitative Methods

The qualitative data consist of individual in-depth interviews, which are particularly suited to understanding experiences and decision-making processes. Our sample was youth ages 19–32, paralleling the older cohorts captured in SYPE who were of an age to be enrolled in tertiary education or to have completed their schooling in 2014. Our sampling strategy was designed to achieve variation in students' school types (public, private, and Azhari), as well as levels of education (secondary or tertiary). Due to the low prevalence of attendance at school types other than public (Assaad and Krafft 2015a), we adopted a purposive sampling strategy. Interviews were conducted in Greater Cairo; Cairo is the capital of Egypt and by far its largest city, with a population of 17.2 million in 2017 (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 2017). As such, there is a greater diversity of schooling options available in greater Cairo as compared with other regions (Krafft et al. 2019). It is also likely that there are more private tutoring options, such as tutoring centers; however, there are no data available to assess this.

Individual respondents were identified using a snowball sampling strategy with several entry points of young people with different socioeconomic backgrounds. In total, 24 students were interviewed, of whom seven were young men and 17 young women. Fifteen were current students, mostly

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE QUALITATIVE
SAMPLE BY SCHOOL TYPE AND LEVEL

| School Type | Respondents |
|-------------------|-------------|
| Primary: | |
| Public | 12 |
| Private | 9 |
| Azhari | 3 |
| Preparatory: | |
| Public | 13 |
| Private | 8 |
| Azhari | 3 |
| Secondary: | |
| Public vocational | 7 |
| Public general | 9 |
| Private | 5 |
| Azhari | 3 |
| Total | 24 |

enrolled at the university level, three (all young men) had dropped out of the highest level in which they had enrolled, and the remaining six had completed their education. The average age of respondents was 21. Table 1 presents the distribution of respondents by school type and level.

Interviews were conducted in 2014 by an Egyptian interviewer trained by the authors. The interviews covered students' educational experiences and reasons for school choices at each school level. Students were also asked about their experiences with tutoring at each level, including whether they took any form of tutoring, in what subjects and why, from whom they took tutoring and why, their perceptions of the prevalence of tutoring among their fellow students, and how their school administrations reacted to tutoring. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed into the original language, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, by the interviewer. The interviews were analyzed in Atlas.ti by the authors using an open coding approach, in which codes and subcodes were derived from the data. The coding families focused on in this article include those related to why students did or did not attend tutoring, from whom they took lessons and why they chose that tutor, and the attitudes and policies of their classroom teachers and school administrators with regards to tutoring. The coding process indicated that saturation was reached for public school students; however, due to the small sample size of private and Azhari students and the greater degree of variation in their schools, saturation was not reached on all topics for these subpopulations.

Results

We integrate the quantitative and qualitative findings in presenting our results, organizing each section by one of the main hypothesized motivations

for private tutoring presented in figure 1. We disaggregate our results by level and school type whenever possible. However, we focus on basic and secondary education because, as shown below, the use of tutoring is less prevalent in higher education.

Patterns of Tutoring across School Levels and (Non-)Exam Years

The SYPE data support the argument that the prevalence of tutoring in Egypt is motivated at least in part by the exam-driven nature of school progression. The use of private tutoring rises as young people progress through the education system, and peaks during pretransition exam years at the end of the preparatory and general secondary stages. Figure 3 shows the percentage of young people who attended different levels of education (currently or in the past) who took private lessons, private group tutoring, in-school group tutoring, or none of these forms of help. Students can potentially take multiple forms of help, sequentially or simultaneously. Additionally, students may take help in multiple subjects; students currently taking tutoring averaged four to five subjects in preparatory and secondary.

Private lessons are the predominant form of educational supplement, with 20 percent of primary students, 36 percent of preparatory students, and 66 percent of general secondary students taking private lessons. As well as an increase in tutoring as they progress through school levels, students are




FIG. 3.—Prevalence of tutoring and lessons by level for youth who currently or previously attend/ed that level (percentages). SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on SYPE 2014.

more likely to take private lessons in exam years. Figure 4 shows the increase in the percentage of current students in the preparatory and general secondary levels who were taking different forms of tutoring, by year within each level. For example, the percentage of current students taking private lessons increased from 25 percent to 26 percent in the first years of preparatory to 37 percent in the third (exam) year. In-school group tutoring is relatively uncommon, with only 8 percent of primary students taking this form of tutoring and less thereafter (fig. 3). Private group tutoring, in contrast, increases in prevalence as students progress through preparatory and when they join general secondary (fig. 4).

The use of educational supplements becomes much less common when students have either been relegated to vocational secondary or have succeeded in accessing higher education. Among vocational secondary students, only 15 percent took private lessons (fig. 3); levels were even lower among postsecondary institute students (8 percent) and university students (10 percent; not shown). Unlike preparatory and general secondary, there is no increase in private lessons while progressing through vocational secondary (fig. 4), as the final exam in that terminal level is not high stakes.

The experiences of the qualitative respondents were consistent with these overall patterns of tutoring attendance in that their use of tutoring increased throughout their educational careers, as well as in terminal years of the key schooling stages. However, the qualitative respondents participated in tutoring at higher levels, with all respondents having taken tutoring in the terminal years of preparatory and secondary school. This is likely due




FIG. 4.—Percentage of current preparatory and secondary students taking educational supplements, by year and level. SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on SYPE 2014.

to the selected nature of the qualitative sample and the fact that all resided in Cairo, where tutoring rates were higher than the national average.³ Qualitative respondents who took tutoring in primary school tended to do so mainly in the later years of the level. By the preparatory level, every single public school respondent, and the majority of those who had attended private or Azhari school, was taking private tutoring (*durus* ‘lessons’ in the Egyptian dialect of Arabic), although some only did so in the final (third) year of that level. As one young woman explained, “In first and second preparatory I didn’t take anything but English, but in the third year, because it’s a diploma [year], I took all the subjects.” She continued to explain her reasoning, saying, “It was all [because of] worry on the part of my mom and dad, that this is a diploma year, and that I have to do well in this stage because I was entering general secondary” (young woman, age 24, on private preparatory school). Public school students also explained that in-school group tutoring was less common at the preparatory level than in primary. “That level [preparatory] is a level of private lessons. There weren’t groups anymore like when we were little” (young woman, age 21, on public preparatory school). In-school group tutoring was not a common aspect of private or Azhari school respondents’ experiences at any schooling level.

By the secondary level, in-school group tutoring appeared to be unheard of even in public schools and all of the respondents who attended public or private general secondary or Azhari secondary took private tutoring at least in the later years of the level. Many of these respondents also said that they took lessons in every single school subject, particularly during their final year. In contrast, but consistent with the SYPE data, the majority of the vocational secondary students did not take any tutoring at the secondary level, saying that “there weren’t any lessons to begin with” (young man, age 24, on public vocational secondary) in their schools. Some attributed this to the ease of the subjects, and others to the nature of vocational education, which has practical as well as theoretical subjects.

Patterns of tutoring prevalence and spending by socioeconomic background in Egypt support the argument that tutoring is a means through which already privileged families reinforce their advantages in the education system. Table 2 presents the results of the probit models estimating the predictors of taking different forms of tutoring at different educational levels. Given the rarity of tutoring at the vocational secondary and higher education levels, we examine the primary, preparatory, and general secondary levels in our models. We present the marginal effects, representing changes in the probability of taking tutoring for different characteristics while taking multiple characteristics into account. Compared with male youth,

³ For example, while nationally 35 percent of current preparatory students took private lessons, 59 percent did so in Cairo. Likewise, while nationally 68 percent of general secondary students took private lessons, 77 percent did so in Cairo.

TABLE 2
 MODELS (PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS) FOR EVER TAKING PRIVATE TUTORING BY LEVEL, YOUTH WHO CURRENTLY OR PREVIOUSLY ATTEND/ED THAT LEVEL

| | Private Lessons | | | Group Tutoring in School | | | Private Group Tutoring | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | Primary | Preparatory | General Secondary | Primary | Preparatory | General Secondary | Primary | Preparatory | General Secondary |
| Sex (male omitted): | | | | | | | | | |
| Female | .017* (.009) | .044*** (.011) | .011 (.019) | .017** (.006) | .012* (.005) | .010 (.008) | .003 (.007) | .026** (.008) | .028 (.017) |
| Mother's education (illiterate omitted): | | | | | | | | | |
| Read and write | -.014 (.020) | .000 (.026) | -.048 (.051) | .001 (.014) | .004 (.013) | -.027 (.023) | .045* (.019) | .053* (.022) | .063 (.047) |
| Primary | .003 (.015) | .025 (.020) | .015 (.040) | .018 (.012) | .014 (.011) | -.029 (.015) | .029* (.013) | .028 (.016) | .028 (.035) |
| Preparatory | .003 (.019) | -.035 (.024) | .032 (.047) | -.012 (.013) | -.002 (.012) | -.025 (.017) | .021 (.017) | .025 (.020) | .009 (.043) |
| General secondary | .086 (.046) | .067 (.053) | .110 (.070) | .002 (.028) | .017 (.025) | -.022 (.028) | .072 (.044) | .067 (.049) | -.042 (.054) |
| Vocational secondary and postsecondary | .079*** (.018) | .099*** (.021) | .064 (.033) | -.019 (.010) | -.006 (.009) | -.036* (.015) | .043** (.014) | .030 (.016) | .018 (.030) |
| Higher education | .113*** (.028) | .154*** (.033) | .109** (.041) | -.029* (.013) | -.018 (.011) | -.030 (.017) | .010 (.019) | -.021 (.021) | -.032 (.037) |
| Father's education (illiterate omitted): | | | | | | | | | |
| Read and write | .033* (.016) | .038* (.019) | .082 (.042) | .037** (.012) | .019 (.011) | -.016 (.017) | -.001 (.012) | .012 (.015) | -.022 (.038) |
| Primary | .064*** (.015) | .108*** (.020) | .096* (.040) | .027** (.010) | .000 (.009) | .013 (.019) | .009 (.012) | .009 (.015) | -.027 (.035) |
| Preparatory | .095*** (.019) | .112*** (.023) | .067 (.046) | .022 (.012) | -.015 (.009) | -.026 (.014) | .023 (.015) | .035* (.018) | -.032 (.040) |
| General Secondary | .049 (.037) | -.013 (.042) | .136* (.069) | .024 (.027) | .038 (.027) | -.021 (.025) | .027 (.036) | .018 (.042) | -.025 (.084) |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| Vocational secondary and postsecondary | .066*** (.016) | .120*** (.020) | .083* (.039) | .025* (.011) | -.008 (.009) | -.010 (.015) | -.005 (.011) | .009 (.014) | -.061 (.034) |
| Higher education | .081*** (.021) | .133*** (.027) | .076 (.044) | .009 (.014) | -.014 (.011) | -.004 (.018) | .030 (.018) | .043* (.021) | -.003 (.041) |
| Father's work status (public wage omitted): | | | | | | | | | |
| Private regular | -.003 (.015) | -.007 (.020) | .031 (.035) | .007 (.010) | .023* (.010) | .011 (.015) | .011 (.013) | .021 (.015) | -.013 (.030) |
| Private irregular | -.041** (.013) | -.080*** (.016) | .004 (.034) | .001 (.009) | -.003 (.007) | -.022* (.011) | -.008 (.010) | -.022 (.012) | -.036 (.029) |
| Employer | .029 (.018) | .094*** (.022) | .077* (.034) | -.001 (.011) | .005 (.010) | -.027** (.010) | -.015 (.012) | -.030* (.015) | -.057* (.027) |
| Self-employed or Unpaid family worker | -.019 (.017) | -.023 (.021) | .026 (.038) | -.003 (.011) | .006 (.010) | .011 (.020) | -.002 (.013) | .009 (.016) | .039 (.035) |
| No job/Don't know/Missing | .006 (.015) | -.006 (.019) | .040 (.029) | -.008 (.009) | .010 (.008) | .007 (.013) | -.017 (.011) | -.016 (.014) | -.011 (.027) |
| Birth cohort (1978–82 omitted): | | | | | | | | | |
| 1983–87 | .007 (.016) | .021 (.021) | -.052 (.041) | .013 (.010) | -.002 (.010) | -.015 (.017) | .002 (.013) | .033* (.015) | .047 (.034) |
| 1988–92 | .014 (.015) | -.003 (.020) | -.018 (.039) | .005 (.010) | -.006 (.010) | -.010 (.017) | .010 (.012) | .014 (.014) | .048 (.032) |
| 1993–99 | .043** (.014) | .046* (.020) | .036 (.038) | .015 (.010) | -.015 (.009) | -.008 (.017) | .007 (.012) | .030* (.014) | .034 (.031) |
| Area of residence included | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N (observations) | 9,591 | 8,715 | 2,909 | 9,591 | 8,543 | 2,673 | 8,978 | 8,715 | 2,661 |

NOTE.—Standard errors in parentheses.

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on SYPE 2014.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

female youth were more likely (usually to a statistically significant extent) to take all three types of tutoring, although differences by sex were relatively small.⁴

A number of dimensions of social advantage were related to tutoring. For instance, having a mother with a secondary or higher education (which is likely to be a marker of high socioeconomic status) predicted a significantly higher chance of private lessons. Compared with those with illiterate fathers, having a father with more education significantly increased the chances of private lessons. There were also important differences by father's work status. For example, children of private irregular workers (the most vulnerable form of employment, linked with poverty [Assaad and Krafft 2015b]), were significantly less likely to take private lessons in primary or preparatory than the children of public wage workers. Because many of the individual characteristics that provide an advantage in terms of taking educational supplements are related (e.g., children with an educated mother tend to also have an educated father who works in the public sector and live in an urban area), the differences by individual characteristics tend to compound each other.

One of the main reasons for the large socioeconomic differences in the use of private tutoring and group lessons is that these educational supplements represent a substantial cost to households. Using the measure of household wealth in SYPE, which is based on an asset index, we can examine how spending relates to family resources for current students. Table 3 presents the percentage of (national) average per capita income spent on private lessons, group lessons, other school costs not directly related to tutoring, and total costs by wealth quintile for current preparatory and general secondary students. Total costs rise with increases in wealth quintile, and much of this increase is driven by differential investments in private tutoring, a result consistent with past research (Sayed and Langsten 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a). For example, in preparatory, the poorest quintile spend about one-fifth (6 percent of national mean per capita income) of the amount spent by the richest (28 percent) on tutoring. Notably, there is a large increase in tutoring expenditure even from the fourth to the richest quintile in both levels, from 16 percent to 28 percent in preparatory, and from 42 percent to 58 percent in general secondary.

Social Expectations and Prevalence of Tutoring

While the patterns in tutoring prevalence and spending suggest that investment in tutoring is a means through which families of higher socioeconomic status reinforce their advantage in the education system, a more

⁴ Past research has similarly found that girls receive either equal investment or more investment in tutoring than boys in Egypt (Elbadawy et al. 2009; Sayed and Langsten 2014; Assaad and Krafft 2015a).

AN EXPLORATION OF THE DRIVERS OF PRIVATE TUTORING IN EGYPT

TABLE 3
MEAN ANNUAL SCHOOL COSTS (AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE NATIONAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE)
BY SCHOOL LEVEL AND WEALTH, CURRENT STUDENTS IN PREPARATORY OR GENERAL SECONDARY

| | Preparatory | | | | General Secondary | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Private Lessons | Group Lessons | Other Costs | Total Costs | Private Lessons | Group Lessons | Other Costs | Total Costs |
| Poorest | 4 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 29 | 1 | 8 | 37 |
| Second | 6 | 4 | 4 | 14 | 20 | 5 | 19 | 43 |
| Middle | 8 | 3 | 8 | 19 | 31 | 10 | 19 | 59 |
| Fourth | 12 | 4 | 7 | 23 | 33 | 9 | 10 | 51 |
| Richest | 22 | 6 | 15 | 43 | 51 | 7 | 22 | 79 |
| Total | 10 | 4 | 7 | 21 | 38 | 7 | 18 | 62 |
| N (observations) | 537 | 537 | 537 | 537 | 734 | 734 | 734 | 734 |

SOURCE.—Authors’ calculations based on SYPE 2014. Per capita expenditure from 2012/2013 HIECS (CAPMAS 2014).

NOTE.—Those who did not have a cost (i.e. those who did not take tutoring or buy books) are incorporated with a value of zero for that cost. Other costs include tuition, uniforms, books and stationery, transportation to school and tutoring, and other school-related costs. Average per capita expenditure is the average across all households and not specific to wealth quintile.

direct indication of the “symbolic function” of tutoring would be if high-performing students or students in elite schools invest more in tutoring than their peers. Unfortunately, estimates of the prevalence of tutoring by student performance or school type are confounded by unobservable factors such as the value families place on education. However, using a combination of the quantitative and qualitative data, we can examine increases in the prevalence of tutoring over time, particularly at the general secondary level, and surrounding social expectations regarding investment in tutoring.

The SYPE data indicate that the prevalence of tutoring has been increasing over time across all levels (fig. 5). While youth born in the mid-1980s had a below 20 percent chance of attending private tutoring during primary school, this rose to nearly 25 percent for youth born in the late 1990s. In-school group tutoring has remained relatively constant, but there has been a slight increase in the prevalence of primary school students taking private group tutoring. Trends are similar for preparatory students, although with higher levels of tutoring. Finally, over the period observed, private tutoring in general secondary rose from 60 percent to 70 percent, while both private and in-school group tutoring remained relatively constant. The increase in tutoring has been a steady trend for some time, predating the events of the 2011 uprising and continuing unabated thereafter.

Agreeing with the trends shown in SYPE, the qualitative respondents unanimously said that private tutoring was a requirement of general secondary school. “From the time I was born until now, it hasn’t been possible that someone enters general secondary school and doesn’t take lessons” (young man, age 19, on public general secondary). Similarly, for private secondary school, one respondent said, “The reason [for taking lessons] is known. In the second and third years of *thanawiyah ‘ammah* you have to take lessons




FIG. 5.—Tutoring trends by year of birth and school level, youth who currently or previously attend/ed that level, five-year moving averages (percentage). SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on SYPE 2014. NOTE.—Years restricted to 1997 and below for secondary, as younger respondents would not have reached these levels.

so that you get a good *magma* [final grade] and get into a good [university] faculty” (young woman, age 23, on private general secondary).

Although less common, some students also described an expectation of tutoring at lower levels of schooling, particularly at the end of preparatory. In a few cases, respondents described the very prevalence of tutoring as one of their reasons for taking tutoring at various levels—whether because of their families' expectations, the desire to be with friends, or the sense that this was simply what was done. This was particularly true among private

school students: “I feel like it’s a fashion. They see their friends at other schools taking lessons, and say ‘let’s go take with them’” (young woman, age 21, on private secondary). That students in private schools, which are typically seen to be higher quality than public schools, also perceived tutoring to be a requirement of general secondary, and sometimes other levels, suggests that the drivers of tutoring are not entirely related to school quality.

School Quality and the Prevalence of Tutoring

A key explanation for why students might engage in tutoring is to compensate for the poor quality of education they receive during the regular school day. Education quality is complex and difficult to quantify. Using the measures available in SYPE, we examine instructional quality to see if teacher behaviors and pedagogy drive tutoring. Current students were asked whether their teachers always, sometimes, or never engaged in certain behaviors. Table 4 shows how students’ reports of a teacher “always” engaging in a behavior were related to private tutoring. Private tutoring and pedagogy had no association. For instance, emphasis on rote memorization was not associated with taking tutoring, nor did students whose teachers do not respond well to questions take more tutoring. However, the lack of association does not conclusively rule out low quality as a motivation for tutoring; the pedagogy measures in table 4 may not be the most relevant dimensions of quality for motivating tutoring. As discussed in the next section, the measures in SYPE may fail to capture the key factor of teacher shirking as it affects pedagogical quality. Additionally, omitted variables may be clouding any association. For example, young people from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, who are more likely to take tutoring in the first place, may have higher quality schools and teachers. Such students might have less need for tutoring due to school quality but be more likely to take tutoring for other reasons, leading to no net difference in private tutoring by school or teacher quality.

Although school environment and pedagogical approach were not major reasons for taking tutoring among students in the qualitative sample either, several respondents from lower socioeconomic backgrounds who attended public schools did note that the conditions for learning were better in tutoring than in school. They attributed this primarily to class size and distractions in the classroom: “Don’t forget that the number of students in the classroom was a lot sometimes . . . it could be 60 students, and it’s hot, and the conditions don’t help one to understand and absorb” (young woman, age 21, on public preparatory). None of the respondents who had attended private schools mentioned conditions in the classroom in relation to taking tutoring. However, a few students in both types of school mentioned the length of the curriculum relative to the time available in class as a reason why they needed to take tutoring.

TABLE 4
 PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT STUDENTS TAKING PRIVATE LESSONS BY MEASURES
 OF TEACHING QUALITY AND SCHOOL LEVEL

| | Level | | | Total | Total (% of Students with Opinion) |
|--|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------|--|
| | Preparatory | Vocational Secondary | General Secondary | | |
| Teachers always encourage students to express opinions openly: | | | | | |
| No | 34 | 12 | 69 | 37 | 87 |
| Yes | 44 | 12 | 61 | 42 | 13 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 38 | 100 |
| Students are always encouraged to form their own opinions: | | | | | |
| No | 35 | 12 | 70 | 37 | 86 |
| Yes | 37 | 14 | 58 | 41 | 14 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 37 | 100 |
| Students always do not understand teacher's answer to questions: | | | | | |
| No | 35 | 12 | 70 | 38 | 82 |
| Yes | 35 | 11 | 60 | 36 | 18 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 37 | 100 |
| Teachers always want students to memorize: | | | | | |
| No | 35 | 12 | 69 | 38 | 59 |
| Yes | 36 | 11 | 65 | 37 | 41 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 37 | 100 |
| Teachers always care about the students' personal problems: | | | | | |
| No | 34 | 12 | 68 | 37 | 85 |
| Yes | 41 | 12 | 68 | 43 | 15 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 38 | 100 |
| Some teachers always beat students and use corporal punishment: | | | | | |
| No | 35 | 12 | 68 | 38 | 86 |
| Yes | 34 | 11 | 69 | 36 | 14 |
| Total | 35 | 12 | 68 | 37 | 100 |
| N (observations) | 536 | 799 | 734 | 2,069 | 2,069 |

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on SYPE 2014.

Another indirect indication of poor school quality is if students skip school to take private lessons, evidence that they find the latter more productive. Data from SYPE indicate that, during the preparatory stage, 65 percent of students were absent from school for at least one day during the year, and 14 percent of students had an absence in order to study. In the general secondary level, 62 percent of students had an absence; 37 percent were absent to study and 12 percent for tutoring, a strong signal that school attendance is insufficient (indeed, potentially counterproductive) to ensure success.

Qualitative respondents who attended general secondary school also said that lessons were more important during that level than attending class, and some even stopped attending class for this reason: "Class wasn't really necessary . . . because I was already taught everything that was said in class.

And what was said in class didn't add [to material learned in tutoring], it was less. So I already learned everything covered in class, and I learned it better" (young woman, age 20, on public general secondary). Although less frequently, some private school students also said that tutoring was more important than class. In combination with the expectation of tutoring in private secondary schools, this suggests that even students whose families invested in private education did not think schooling provided everything needed to prepare for the all-important *thanawiyyah 'ammah*.

"The Teacher Does Not Explain in Class": Poor Quality by Design?

The qualitative respondents' discussions of an additional aspect of school quality—the degree to which teachers do or do not attempt to teach material effectively in class—adds an important dimension to the question of whether students take tutoring to compensate for poor quality schools. Teachers' failure to teach, or as respondents put it, "explain" (*yeshrah*) well in class was the most commonly mentioned reason for taking tutoring among students in the qualitative sample. Respondents who attended general secondary school, in particular, described a situation in which teachers deliberately failed to teach during class time in order to pressure their students to take lessons: "When we entered secondary school the real pressure on lessons began. The teachers didn't teach to begin with, so it started that you had to take lessons" (young woman, age 20, on public general secondary). Although more commonly mentioned among respondents who attended public secondary school, a few private secondary school students also said that some of their teachers neglected classroom learning because of lessons.

Lack of teaching in school was most commonly reported at the general secondary level, but there were some respondents who reported facing similar indirect pressure to take tutoring in public preparatory and even primary schools: "The school controlled everything, that the teacher didn't try very hard in class, he tried harder in the group lessons and in private lessons" (young man, age 23, on public primary school). In lower levels of schooling, respondents reported that teacher shirking in class was directed as much toward pushing students into in-school group tutoring as toward private lessons.

Direct Teacher Pressure to Take Tutoring

As indicated by the interviewees, shirking in class was a means by which teachers "encouraged" their students to take private lessons specifically with them. The SYPE data corroborated that students did often take lessons or tutoring with their own teacher. Taking lessons with one's own teacher was particularly common at the preparatory level, when 71 percent of those taking tutoring did so with their teacher. When students took tutoring in vocational secondary, it was often with their teacher as well (63 percent), whereas in

general secondary around half (47 percent) of students taking tutoring did so with their teacher.

According to the reasons that students reported in SYPE, the primary driver for taking tutoring with one's teacher was that they are a good teacher. In preparatory, 74 percent of students gave this as the reason for taking tutoring with their teacher. Most of the remaining students said their teacher was simply who they knew (15 percent), while 5 percent said the teacher imposed tutoring, and 7 percent explained that it was their teacher who set the exam. The teacher setting the exam was a greater incentive in vocational secondary (18 percent), but otherwise the main reason for using one's own teacher for tutoring in both vocational (64 percent) and general secondary (83 percent) was that they are a good teacher. It is unclear whether the SYPE respondents found their teachers to be good teachers in school, in private lessons, or both, but it should be noted that the qualitative respondents reported very different levels of teaching quality in the classroom and in tutoring.

Differing from the SYPE results, the qualitative respondents suggested that the primary reason for taking lessons with one's own teacher was to gain preferential treatment or, conversely, to avoid punitive measures that teachers imposed on students who did not take tutoring.⁵ These findings suggest that the SYPE questions might not be capturing the complex dynamics of student-teacher interactions around tutoring. Not teaching in class was, in fact, one of the less coercive methods that the qualitative respondents reported their teachers using to encourage them to take lessons. Respondents commonly described teachers giving students whom they tutored preferential treatment, whether by giving those particular students more opportunities to participate in class and paying more attention to them or by distributing exam questions during tutoring: "The child that was in the group lessons was special to the teacher, there was more attention paid to him [the child] during class. He [the child] knew the lesson before it was taught in class because of the group lesson. . . . So I liked the group lessons more because of that" (young woman, age 24, on public primary school). Many of these tactics of giving preference to students who enrolled in tutoring actively detracted from the learning and class participation opportunities of other students.

Some respondents also reported teachers refusing to give students who did not attend tutoring a passing grade on their nonexam coursework (*'amal es sina*): "You had to take lessons with the teacher who taught you in class because of the coursework grades" (young woman, age 20, on public preparatory school). Teachers' control over classroom grades was a very

⁵ SYPE respondents in Cairo were somewhat more likely (11 percent at the preparatory and general secondary levels) than the national rate to report that they took tutoring with the teacher because the teacher imposed it. However, this difference is not large enough to explain the difference with the qualitative findings.

direct reason for students to take tutoring with their own classroom teacher and was commonly cited for preparatory school and early secondary school—when in-class grades held substantial weight for students.

In other cases, teachers' tactics for coercing students into taking tutoring were less about test results and more about how teachers treated them during class. There were reports of teachers constantly reminding students (and sometimes parents) that they should enroll in lessons, or singling students out in class. In more extreme cases, respondents (in the following case, a young woman, age 24, commenting on public primary school) reported that their teachers yelled at or hit students who did not take lessons.

INTERVIEWER: How did [the teacher] treat you to make you take lessons?

RESPONDENT: There was hitting and yelling, and we would sit in the back in the last row and not talk. You didn't have the right to answer anything or read—they used to have us read the lesson first out loud and then begin to explain it bit by bit—so we didn't have the right to talk.

In other cases, respondents said that teachers refrained from punishing students who took lessons with them when those students made mistakes in class or did not do their schoolwork, whereas other students were routinely punished. Such coercive tactics by teachers appeared to be most common at the primary and preparatory level, whereas by general secondary there was a general assumption that students would take tutoring.

Furthermore, a number of respondents who had attended public schools described their school administrators taking an active part in the economy of tutoring at the primary and preparatory levels. These experiences demonstrated the extent to which in-school group tutoring, originally intended to counter the spread of tutoring, in fact did the exact opposite, as respondents reported that *magmu'at* had been organized by their schools and were presented as obligatory for students by both teachers and administrators: "The director of the school used to go around to all the class and say 'everyone, there are supplementary [*taqweiya*] classes in the school so you should really join them'" (young man, age 24, on public primary school). This "required" in-school group tutoring was reported to consist, in most cases, of the entire class of students who attended the regular school day together, taught by the same teacher, on school grounds. In other words, in-school group tutoring was a paid extension of students' regular school day.

The degree to which teachers placed direct pressure on students to take tutoring appeared to vary quite a bit by school, even within the same level and area. Some students who said they were directly pressured to take lessons at one school level said they were not in another, even if both were public schools in the same neighborhood. Many also mentioned certain teachers in their schools who did not pressure students into taking tutoring, or who refused to

give lessons altogether. The qualitative respondents reported very few instances of tutoring-based preferential treatment by teachers in private or Azhari schools, and no instances of mistreatment or more direct coercion, suggesting that these tactics may be more common in public schools.⁶

Discussion and Conclusion

Private tutoring in Egypt has become so widespread as to constitute a shadow education system that is effectively privatizing the theoretically free public education system. In this article, we build on previous literature on private tutoring in Egypt to systematically examine the drivers of tutoring at different levels of the school system based on a framework developed from international literature. The combination of quantitative and qualitative data from different school types and levels allows us to take a broad view of the tutoring market in Egypt and to indicate some of the reasons why previous policy efforts to combat tutoring have been unsuccessful. Our findings suggest that the tutoring phenomenon is too complex to be attributed to a single main factor. Rather, there are multiple drivers of tutoring in Egypt that vary by school level, student background, and school type. Our results support the argument that the orientation of Egypt's educational system around high-stakes exams is an important structural driver of tutoring (World Bank 2007, 2008; Elbadawy et al. 2009; Assaad and Krafft 2015a). However, there appears to be an important distinction between the primary and preparatory levels, on the one hand, and general secondary, on the other, in terms of how this exam-driven context interacts with other drivers of tutoring.

In general secondary, the prevalence of tutoring appears to have reached the level that there is a social expectation of tutoring. Combined with a strong incentive for teachers to fill demand for tutoring, this has led to classroom environments in which teacher and student shirking has become the norm. As argued in the international literature, the structural drivers of tutoring and expectation that students will rely on tutoring have become self-reinforcing (Bray 2017). The issue of teachers not explaining in class is symptomatic of this self-reinforcing dynamic; general secondary students rely on private tutoring in order to do well on exams, in part due to the insufficient quality of in-school education, but as long as students rely on tutoring, neither they nor teachers have an incentive to invest effort in improving school quality.

⁶ Other research using nationally representative data, with a larger sample size that allows for examining tutoring by school type, found that there were not significantly different probabilities of taking private lessons across different school types, but that compared with public schools, students of all other types had a significantly lower probability of in-school group tutoring (Assaad and Krafft 2015a).

At the primary and preparatory levels, in contrast, there does not appear to be a strong general expectation that students will rely on tutoring as a quasi-requirement of the level. Tutoring at these levels is more concentrated on end-of-level exam years and does not appear to be a major factor for private or Azhari students; furthermore, students did not describe tutoring in primary or preparatory as a substitute for school. Rather, teacher and administrator pressure, in various forms, is an important driver of tutoring at these levels in public schools. The reports of students in our sample echo findings from other studies in Cairo (Sobhy 2012; Hartmann 2013) and suggest that teacher pressure to take tutoring is a serious problem that affects classroom dynamics and curbs the learning opportunities of students.

Another concerning element of the qualitative respondents' reports of teacher and administrator coercion was that these reports came primarily from young people who had attended public schools in low-income areas of Cairo, who were also most likely to report problems with school conditions. Thus, school quality concerns and problematic teacher incentives may place the most pressure on the very students who can least afford private lessons. These aspects of classroom dynamics may serve to further reinforce educational inequality of opportunity. We found large socioeconomic differentials in the likelihood of students taking tutoring, which is unsurprising because tutoring represents a substantial cost that is burdensome to many families. The necessity of spending large sums on private tutoring in order to access higher education constitutes an important barrier to equal opportunity in education (World Bank 2007; Assaad and Krafft 2015a).

While our work adds important evidence on the drivers of tutoring in Egypt, a number of limitations could be addressed by future work. Although this is one of the first studies to combine quantitative and qualitative data on tutoring in Egypt, both of our data sources have limitations. As with previous studies (Hartmann 2008; Sobhy 2012), our qualitative data come exclusively from Greater Cairo, where tutoring is more prevalent and educational options are more diverse than in other parts of the country. Future studies should aim to explore whether the drivers of tutoring differ substantially in other parts of the country, particularly rural areas. The measures of school quality in SYPE are also limited, which makes it particularly difficult to interpret differences in the quantitative and qualitative data regarding the dynamics of teacher-student interaction around tutoring and students' decisions to take tutoring with their classroom teachers. As our qualitative results agree with other studies (Hartmann 2008; Sobhy 2012) in finding widespread reports of teacher pressure to take tutoring, at least in Cairo, it is possible that different survey measures are needed to be able to explore this phenomenon in more detail quantitatively. We are also unable to identify causal linkages between different drivers of tutoring with our

data, or to directly examine the relationship between low teacher pay and tutoring.

Our finding that Azhari students faced less pressure to take tutoring also merits further exploration, particularly as this result was based on a small subset of the qualitative sample. Azhari is a low-cost form of education and is thus a substitute for public schooling that is within reach of Egyptian families across socioeconomic backgrounds. Tutoring practices in Azhari schools could be an important driver of demand for this type of education that has thus far been unexplored in the literature.

Egypt is a particularly interesting case for the global literature on tutoring because a policy banning tutoring is already in place, and the Ministry of Education has recently been considering criminalization of tutoring (Qadr 2018). However, the current ban has clearly not curbed the practice, and commentators on the proposed law noted that even if it allows the government to shut down tutoring centers, it is not possible to prevent tutoring within private homes (Qadr 2018). Enforcement, either of the current ban or of the proposed law, is thus very difficult. Offering alternatives to private lessons, such as in-school group tutoring, also cannot be the solution in a system where teachers and administrators have a strong incentive to benefit from additional lessons and students and parents are very unlikely to opt out of or to oppose a practice that often ensures—directly or indirectly—progression through the school system. The most important area for policy intervention is thus teacher incentives and accountability. Raising teacher salaries is one potential intervention worthy of investigation. Evidence on the relationship between teacher salaries and the choice to tutor in Egypt suggests that a higher salary is associated with a lower chance that a teacher will offer private lessons. However, regardless of their salary level teachers will still face the incentive to earn extra income from tutoring (Ille 2015).

Although parents in Egypt play a role in the proliferation of tutoring, they have done so in part because it is their sole option for affecting the quality of their children's education (Lloyd et al. 2003). Giving parents other avenues to influence education quality may help reduce demand for tutoring. Closer oversight—for instance, by parent councils—has been shown to be associated with reduced tutoring in other contexts (Dang and King 2013) and may improve quality (Carr-Hill et al. 2016). Currently in Egypt parents report that existing councils are not effective (Ille 2015).

One challenge linked to both the drivers of teacher incentives and high-stakes exams is coming up with an impartial measure of student performance that is not affected by tutoring activity. It is not possible, for example, to identify whether students achieve good scores because of quality in-class teaching or because they have taken tutoring. Relying on teacher grades rather than high-stakes exams for progression through the schooling system is likely to generate further incentives for coercion. Reliance on evaluation

by school administrators is problematic as well, since, as demonstrated by this study, school administrators sometimes have a vested interest in maintaining tutoring activity. A change in student assessment methods, whereby classroom teacher control over grades in nondiploma years is reduced, could alleviate incentives for teachers to pressure students into tutoring. External examiners (such as retired teachers or teachers from other levels of the school system) have been shown to improve the functioning of the exam system in other contexts by reducing cheating among students or teachers (Bertoni et al. 2013).

Despite the fact that private tutoring is a major challenge in numerous countries, little is known about how to tackle key concerns such as coercive behavior and negative effects on in-class teaching. Given the complexity of the drivers of tutoring at different levels and among different subpopulations, multifaceted approaches will likely be needed to reduce this form of educational privatization. There is a strong tradition of randomized controlled trials investigating what works to improve education globally that could potentially be drawn upon (Glewwe et al. 2013; Kremer et al. 2013; McEwan 2015). A concerted and innovative effort to develop and test approaches to reduce tutoring is critical to fostering greater equality of opportunity within a truly free universal education system in Egypt.

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